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Norway was the first country in the world to pass
legislation specifying gender representation on com-
pany boards. The Norwegian Parliament in Decem-
ber 2003 passed a new regulation that required at
least 40 percent of each gender on company boards.
The law’s aim was to create more gender equality
and to increase companies’ profitability. Especially
managers and owners in the business sector met the
law with significant resistance. In the ensuing heated
debate, they maintained that not enough willing,
competent women existed to fill the specified quota
(Teigen 2002; Cvijanovic 2009).
The law, which went into force in the beginning of
2008, has led to major changes in the gender com-
position of corporate boards. In 2002, only about 4
percent of board members were women, while in
2009, all boards had reached the goal of 40 percent
women. The law’s successful implementation is due
to its fairly tough sanctions for non-compliance.
After several warnings, legal authorities have the
power to dissolve those firms not following the rules.
Nevertheless, no firm has been dissolved as a result
of the law.
This article will look at the competence of new
female directors.This will be done in two ways. First
we shall look at formal competence,such as type and
level of education and main occupation. Secondly,
we shall see how board members themselves evalu-
ate the competence of the new women on the board,
which will provide information on both the formal
and informal aspects of qualifications.The main em-
pirical source for this article is a questionnaire sent
to all board members in public limited companies at
the beginning of 2009, one year after the reform was
implemented. In all 990 board members replied, a
reply rate of 62 percent (for more information about
the questionnaire, Heidenreich and Storvik 2010).
Background
While Norway is one of the countries with the high-
est rates of working women and the highest percent-
age of women in politics,the representation of wom-
en in positions of power in work organisations is one
of the lowest in the West. This has been named the
Norwegian paradox (Kvande 1998) and it still per-
sists. In 2002 one year prior to the law, about 4 per-
cent of top managers in the most influential compa-
nies were women (Skjeie and Teigen 2003). Parallel
statistics show the number of female managers in
similar positions in the United States to be 14 per-
cent, in the United Kingdom 17 percent and in Ger-
many 8 percent at the time (International Labour
Office 2004).The new quota regulation can be seen,
at least partly, as a reaction to the low stable level of
female managers in Norway.While it was nearly im-
possible for the government, via the law, to increase
the number of female managers in the private sector,
it was possible to target female representation on
company boards (Teigen 2008).
The new quota regulation is an amendment to the
Companies Act.It requires that both genders are re-
presented according to the following principles:
• Where there are only two or three board mem-
bers, both genders should be represented.
• Where there are four or five board members,both
genders should be represented by at least two
members each.
• Where there are six to eight board members,both
genders should be represented by at least three
members each.
• Where there are nine or more board members,
each gender should be represented by at least 40
percent each.
• These rules also apply to the election of deputy
board members. * Institute for Social Research, Oslo.The quota regulation applies to all publicly-owned
companies and to public limited companies in the
private sector. In this way the quota regulation tar-
gets central parts of the Norwegian economy
(Storvik and Teigen 2010).A public limited company
is a company in which none of the members is per-
sonally liable for the company’s debts. This type of
company usually has many shareholders and rather
strict rules regarding the composition of the board
and the amount of share capital. The law requires
that a company registered as a public limited com-
pany is also listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.
These companies are the elite of the Norwegian eco-
nomy. There are approximately 450 public limited
companies in Norway. The government has not yet
proposed a quota regulation for privately-owned
limited liability companies. Most of these companies
are very small family enterprises with few owners,and
the owners are themselves members of the boards.
The legal rules that applies to this type of company
are not as strict. In Norway there are 164 000 private
limited companies. In 2005, Norwegian public limited
companies averaged EUR 136 million in sales, while
private limited companies averaged EUR 2 million in
sales (2009).
The quota regulation applies to what is elsewhere
termed “the supervisory board”.In contrast to coun-
tries in central Europe, Norway has a so-called one-
tier system (Hagen 2010), which means that compa-
nies only have one board consisting of owners’ rep-
resentatives and employee-elected representatives.
Norwegian companies do not have an executive
board of managers; the company instead delegates
the task of management to one person, a general
manager (CEO).The board of directors appoints the
general manager. The general manager is responsi-
ble for the day-to-day management of the company’s
activities. However, the board still has the final re-
sponsibility for the management of the company,and
the general manager must follow the guidelines and
orders issued by the board of directors.The board of
directors ensures that the business activities are sound-
ly organized. It must be informed of the company’s
financial position and is obliged to ensure that its
activities, accounts and asset management are sub-
ject to adequate control.
When the Norwegian government introduced the
quota rule, it was unique; no other country had im-
plemented similar regulations.Since its introduction,
a diffusion process seems to be taking place.All over
Europe,the Norwegian corporate boards’ quota rule
has sparked debates about the persistent male dom-
inance in economic decision-making and about the
possibility and feasibility of adopting similar quota
arrangements (e.g.,The Economist, 13 March 2010).
The Spanish government has committed itself to
achieving board representation of least 40 percent
for each gender by the year of 2015 (De Anca 2008).
Iceland has recently followed suit and will require
companies with more than 50 employees to have
board representation of least 40 percent for each
gender from 2013.1 Similar policies are also either
being implemented or intensely debated in many
countries, including the Netherlands2, France3, Swe-
den, Belgium and Germany.
Formal competence of the new female directors
How do the new female board members differ from
male board members and other female board mem-
bers who have served on boards before the reform?
It is not quite clear exactly when the reform started
to work because it was put into force step by step.
However, from 2006 the law was made mandatory
for all new companies and the already established
companies were given a transitional period of two
years. Therefore we shall consider board members
who have been at the board before 2006, i.e., more
than three years, and board members with less than
three years experience.
As Table 1 shows, the new female board members
clearly have a higher level of education than the
three other groups. Nearly twice as many of the new
female board members have six or more years of
education compared to male board members who
entered the board after the reform. If we compare
the new female board members with women who
were on the board before the reform,we see that the
newcomers also have a higher level of education.
The Table also shows that women who were on the
board before the reform also have more education
than the male board members do, but the difference
is not significant. In general, the study shows that
female board members have higher education than
men, a finding in line with studies of Hillman et al.
(2002) and Singh et al. (2008). If we compare the
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1 http://www.nikk.no/?module=Articles;action=Article.publicShow;
D=10542 (accessed Feb. 2011).
2 In December 2009, the government of the Netherlands decided
that all companies with more than 250 employees should have at
least 30 percent women on their boards. If this goal is not reached
by 2016, the company must prepare a plan to reach the goal.
Whether this can be implemented is, however, not clear.
3 http://www.toutpourlesfemmes.com/conseil/IMG/pdf/egalite-
hommes-femmes.pdf (accessed Feb. 2011).CESifo DICE Report 1/2011 37
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Norwegian directors’ level of education with their
English and French colleagues in the top 100 compa-
nies in each country (Maclean et al. 2006), we find
that the Norwegians have higher education than the
English and at least comparable education level to
the French.
Among all groups, most directors report that their
highest degree is in economics. The next most fre-
quent education is in engineering and the natural sci-
ences. This is also the main education for board
directors in the top 100 companies in France and
England, as Maclean et al. (2006) show. In our study,
more men than women have a degree in engineering
or in the natural sciences but the difference is not
large. The third most common educational back-
ground is law for both the new women and all men.
Somewhat more new women than men have this
education, and the difference is significant. If we
look at men and new women who are educated in
the social,humanities or aesthetic disciplines there is
no significant difference.
As we see in Table 2,there are clear tendencies in the
educational background of board members.The new
women have more education than the other groups
do and their types of education are similar to that of
the men.We do not know anything about the educa-
tion of the men who left the board because of the
reform. However, there is no reason to believe that
the best-educated men or the
men with the most relevant edu-
cations left to make room for the
new female board members.
More of the reform women than
of the men state that their main
occupation is manager. It is not
possible to distinguish between dif-
ferent management levels in the
study, and it is likely that many
women are at a lower management
level than male board members are.
There are very few female CEOs in
Norwegian business enterprises
(Heidenreich 2009) and according
to Ahern and Dittmar (2009), the
number of CEOs on the boards has
gone down as a result of the re-
form.As Table 3 also shows, signif-
icantly more men than women re-
port that their primary occupa-
tion is owner, part owner or part-
ner.The fact that women are gen-
erally less often owners (Spilling 2002) might be
what causes this difference. If we compare the new
board women with the women who have been at the
board before the reform,we find that more of the new
Table 1 











4 5 9  10 
General upper secondary
school 4 5 3 4 
Higher education, three 
years or less 13 23 17 19 
Higher education, four or
five years 40 41 52 42 
Higher education, six years
or more 40 27 19 23 
Total 100 100 100 100 
N 278  88  256  240 
Notes: Question asked: What is your highest completed education? Reform
women: 0–3 years on the board,pre-reform women: more than three years on
the board, new men: 0–3 years on the board, pre-reform men: more than
three years on the board. The difference between reform women and the
other groups is significant at the 1 percent level for the category “Higher
education, six years or more”. The difference between pre-reform women
and men is not significant for this category of education. 
  Source: Storvik (2010).
Table 2  








Law 8 14 8 10





56 1 1 6
Engineering or
natural sciences 30 26  17 27
Else 8 8 5 8
Total 100 100 100 100
N 502 279  88 877
Notes: Question asked:  What type of education do
you have? In what discipline do you have your high-
est degree? Reform women with 0–3 years on the
board, pre-reform women with more than three
years on the board and men. The only difference be-
tween men and reform women significant at the
5 percent level is for the category “Law”. For the
category “Economics” there is a significant differ-
ence at the 5 percent level between reform women
and pre-reform women. There are no other signifi-
cant differences between these two groups of
women.
Source: Storvik (2010).women choose the category “other employee” as their
main occupation.
According to Huse (2007), ownership appears as a
“qualification” for board membership. It might be ar-
guable that ownership is a form of motivation rather
than a qualification, and many owners want to be on
the board. As shown above, significantly more men
than women say that ownership is there main occupa-
tion (Table 3).In addition,many more men than wom-
en report that they or someone in their nearest family
represents owner interests in the company where they
are board members.While 35 percent of the men state
this, only 11 percent of the women do so (table not
shown). Ownership therefore appears to be a type of
“qualification”that women lack.If we look at the num-
ber of shareholders who are elected board members
and are also owners in the companies after the reform,
we find that this applies to 25 percent of the directors.
In a study carried out in 2003 before the quota reform,
Econ (2003) found that this applied to 35 percent of all
directors in this type of companies.This implies that the
number of directors with ownership interests appears
to have dropped after the reform.
Board members’ own evaluation of the new
women’s competence
How do board members themselves think that the
new women have influenced the boards work after
the reform? As we shall see,the answers to this ques-
tion also tell us about how board directors evaluate
the new women’s board competence. If the new fe-
male directors are noticeably better or less qualified,
it is likely that this also should have an impact on
board work.All board members were therefore asked
if they had experienced changes in board perfor-
mance after the reform.
As Table 4 shows, a clear majority, 48 percent, say
that they have not experienced any noticeable
change in the boards’ work after the reform.In total,
16 percent have experienced a positive change and 
6 percent have experienced a negative change. If we
weigh the group that has experienced a positive
change against the group that has experienced a
negative change, we find that the positive experiences
outweigh the negative ones. Based on the board mem-
bers’ own experiences, the reform has had overall a
slightly positive effect on the board’s work.
It is possible that companies in sectors with few fe-
male employees and few female managers have ex-
perienced the reform as more problematic than com-
panies in other sectors. Few women in the sector
might limit the pool of potential female board mem-
bers.Both Hillman et al.(2007) and Grosvold (2009)
show that a positive correlation exists between the
number of women in the sector and the number of
women board members in the sector. However the
analysis shows no connection between reform expe-
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Table 3 









ship is my main
occupation. 
15 11 9 13
Owner/part
owner/partner 39 20 27 32
Manager 43  53 62 48
Other employee 15 21  12 17
Other 6 5 4 5
Notes: Question asked: What is your main occupa-
tion? Multiple answers possible. Reform women 0–3
years on the board, pre-reform women with more
than three years on the board and men. There are 
significant differences at the 1 percent level between
men and reform women for the category “Owner,
part owner, partner” and for the category “Mana-
ger”. There is a significant difference at the 5 per-
cent level between reform women and pre-reform
women for the category “Other employee”, other-
wise there are no significant differences between
these groups of women.
Source: Storvik(2010).
Table 4 
Changes in the board’s work after the reform (in %) 
Men Women All
A positive change 12  20  16 
No noticeable
change  60 33 48 
A negative change 11 1 6 
The reform didnot 
target us. 8  10 9
O t h e r 232
Do not know 7 34 19
Total 100 100 100
N 500 366 872
Notes: Question asked: The quota reform has led
to a considerable increase in the number of women
on boards. Have you experienced changes in the 
board’s work after the reform? The difference be-
tween the group who have experienced a positive
change and the group who have experienced a ne-
gative change is significant at the level of 1 percent.
The difference between men and women who have
experienced a positive change is significant at the 
level of 1 percent.
Source: Storvik(2010).CESifo DICE Report 1/2011 39
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rience and the number of female managers in the
sector (table not shown). For nearly all sectors, we
find a positive effect of the reform.
Board members who stated that they had experi-
enced a positive change were asked what kind of po-
sitive change they had experienced (Table 5). Most
mention the introduction of new perspectives and
that more discussion takes place.Slightly fewer men-
tion that the new female board members have im-
portant areas of competence the board previously
lacked,and even fewer mention that board work has
become more pleasant. The two most seldom men-
tioned alternatives are that the reform has increased
the weight put on knowledge and analysis and that
the new female board members are particularly clev-
er. Clearly, the main positive effects of the reform
are the introduction of new perspectives and that
more discussion takes place.
Among the few board members who have experi-
enced a negative change, nearly all say that the new
female board members lack important areas of com-
petence and insight (Table 6). Nearly no one says
that more disagreement occurs or that less weight is
placed on knowledge or analysis. Very few board
members mention more discussions or more misun-
derstandings as a negative consequence. This shows
that to a large extent board members agree about
what the negative consequences of the reform are.
Viewpoints about the consequences of the quota
reform can, of course, also stem from personal inter-
ests and ideological persuasions. It is possible that
primarily the new women report these positive expe-
riences, because they see that the reform is in their
own personal interest. From Table 4 we see that
more women than men say that the reform has had
positive effects.Barely any of the women report that
the work has become heavier after the reform.
Among the men, nearly the same number have no-
ticed positive changes as those who have noticed
negative changes.This shows that mainly the women
have experienced positive effects, while for the men
the gains balance the losses.
With this perspective, it is also interesting to look at
a group of respondents who appear especially quali-
fied to have an opinion, namely the ones with four
years or more of board service. These respondents
have experienced the development from before the
reform’s implementation,when the number of wom-
en on the board was low, until spring 2009 when
40 percent of board members were female.If we first
look at the group serving before the reform, we find
that 20 percent have experienced a positive impact
and 12 percent have experienced a negative impact.
Table 5  
Improvements after the reform (in %) 
Men Women All
More pleasant atmos-
phere 39 26 32










More weight is placed on
knowledge and analysis. 16 37 27
More discussion takes 
place. 62 71 67
New perspectives have 
been introduced. 77 78 78
N 61 73 135
Notes: Question asked: How do you think the board’s
work has improved after the reform? Respondents:
only those who think that board work has improved. 
Multiple answers possible. The difference between
men and women is significant at the level of 5 per-
cent for category two and four. Figures show the




Troublesome developments after the reform (in %) 
Men Women All
New female board
members lack important 
competence and insight
96 100 100
Less weight is put on
knowledge and analysis 15 0 15
More disagreement 2 100 12
More misunderstandings 24 16 24
Too much discussion 30 3 33
N5 2 6 5 8
Notes: Question asked: How do you think the board’s
work has become heavier after the reform? Re-
spondents: only those who think that board work has
improved. Multiple answers possible. The difference 
between men and women is significant at 1 percent
level for category three and five. The percentage who
replied that the board’s work had worsened after the
reform is not quite identical in Tables 1 and 4. The
reason is that some respondents who were instructed
to skip this question chose not to do so and instead re-
plied. Figures indicate the actual number of respond-
ents whohave chosen the alternatives.
Source: Storvik(2010).The analysis shows that not only women who be-
came board members as a result of the reform are po-
sitive towards it.Amongst both men and women who
served on boards before the reform we find that the
number of positive experiences appears to outweigh
the number of negative experiences.
So what does this tell us about the new female direc-
tors’ competence? As we only asked respondents
who had noticed a change in the boards’ work after
the reform to elaborate what these were means that
only changes of a certain impact are reported. That
most board members have not experienced any
change in board work at all after the reform indi-
cates that the new female directors appear to be at
least approximately as competent as their predeces-
sors. It is also interesting to note that almost exactly
the same number of respondents report that the new
female board members lack important competence
and insight, as those number who say that the new
women have important board competence previous-
ly lacking.Judged on the basis of the board members
own experiences, we therefore conclude that the re-
form has not led to a noticeable decrease in the over-
all competence of the directors.
Discussion and conclusion
As stated, it was suggested prior to the reform that
there were not enough willing and competent wom-
en so sit on the boards.Judged on the basis of formal
qualification and the other directors’ evaluation of
the new women’s competence, this is not the case.
The new female board members appear to be and
are perceived as being as competent as the other
board members.
The survey indicated that in terms of formal qualifi-
cations the new women have, in general, the same
types of education and occupations as the rest of the
directors have. Furthermore, the new women clearly
have a higher level of education.This might indicate
that the competence on the boards has in fact in-
creased as a result of the reform. However, it is like-
ly that the new women are managers at lower levels
that their male colleagues. As mentioned before,
Ahern and Dittmar (2009) find that the number of
CEOs at the boards has gone down as a result of the
reform. Further we do not know if the new female
directors work experiences are as relevant as the
other directors.Our survey does not tell us what kind
of management experience the new female directors
have had or in what sector their work experience is
from. Earlier research has shown that female man-
agers more often than male managers are found in
administrative management positions (Kanter 1977).
In addition,Terjesen, Sealy and Singh (2009) report-
ed that female directors are more often managers
from less successful companies and tend to have had
an earlier career in public or non-profit organisa-
tions (Singh, Terjesen and Vinnicombe 2008). To be
on the safe side it is therefore best to conclude that
the formal qualification of the new female board mem-
bers indicate that they appear to be equally competent
when compared with the other board members.
If we consider the board members’ own experience
about how the boards’ work has developed after the
reform this impression is strengthened.The large ma-
jority of directors say that they have not experienced
any change in the board’s work.Among the few who
have noticed a change, more have noticed a positive
rather than a negative development.The positive ex-
perience that most directors mention includes the in-
troduction of new perspectives and increased discus-
sion.On the negative side the most mentioned expe-
rience is that the new female board members lack
important competence and insight. However, nearly
the same number who report that the new women
lack important competence say that the new female
board members have important competence previ-
ously lacking on the board. On the basis of these
findings it can be concluded that all in all the new
women are perceived as being as competent as their
predecessors.
In the 18 months prior to the quota law’s going into
force, more companies than usual changed their reg-
istration form from public limited companies to pri-
vate limited companies.This might appear to be a re-
action to the new law.As part of the research project,
we conducted telephone interviews with CEOs or
chairs for these companies (Heidenreich and Storvik
2010).The study showed that of the five hundred com-
panies which existed before 2006, only 2 percent
changed their registration form because they could
not find competent women.All in all it is thus possi-
ble to conclude that nearly all companies had no
problems finding qualified women.
The opposition against the quota proposition that
characterised Norwegian political and public debate
for close to ten years has now more or less vanished.
One important reason for this is probably that it has
proved possible to recruit a sufficient number of com-
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petent women. Furthermore, nothing indicates that
the quota policy has negatively affected the running
and profitability of firms. In consequence, the oppo-
sition seems to have disappeared. The symbolic ef-
fect of the changes in the gender composition of com-
pany boards should not be underestimated. Even
though only a small number of companies were tar-
geted by the reform,they are the largest and most in-
fluential companies in the country.The board rooms
which were previously occupied primarily by men
are currently very close to having achieved gender
balance. The long term consequences of the reform
are, however, not yet visible.
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